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'WHAT GOD HIMSELF CANNOT TELL US': 
REALISM VERSUS METAPHYSICAL REALISM 
D.Z. Phillips 
The paper discusses the confusion which results from equating realism with 
metaphysical realism. The latter can be influenced by a Cartesian legacy 
which creates a gap between consciousness and reality. That gap is not 
closed by philosophies of religion under the influence of empiricism, neo-
Kantianism, Reid, or Reformed Epistemology. As a result, "God" is located, 
philosophically, in an alleged metaphysical space that not even God could 
tell us anything about. A philosophical contemplation of the life in our 
words, including religious words, involves bringing them back to reality 
from a "metaphysical reality" which is a product of confusion. 
1. On Understanding the State of Philosophy 
Philosophy is a high calling, but with humble subject matter. But how is 
it to be w1.derstood? In contemporary philosophy of religion, we need to 
answer that question by going beyond what many take to be an exclusive 
choice between analytic philosophy, an Enlightenment conception of ratio-
nal enquiry, and postmodernism.' 
Many who adhere to the Enlightenment conception think that analytic 
philosophers have turned their backs on philosophy's high calling. They 
have accused them, according to Nicholas Wolterstorff, of failing 'to ask 
what reason has to say about religion, and then to listen to reason's voice. 
Rather than being philosophers, they are, at bottom, defenders of the faith, 
using the tools of philosophy!'2 
Wolterstorff should not be surprised at the accusation. After all, he does 
say that analytic philosophers 'have not only been willing to describe reli-
gion from within, they have practised philosophy of religion from within'/ 
and that religious affiliations shape 'in one way or another what they do'.' 
They are what Wolterstorff calls 'perspectival particularists'.5 He does not 
think this calls for any apology. On the contrary, 'They make no effort to 
conceal this fact about themselves.'6 
It would be a mistake to think that Wolterstorff is simply pointing out 
distinctive features of analytic philosophy. With respect to the claim that 
our personal perspectives and commitments shape what we do in philoso-
phy, analytic philosophers, he tells us, 'regard something of the sort as 
inevitable for everyone'.? These meta-epistemological considerations, 
apparently, affect 'the understanding of philosophy itself, not just ... the 
philosophers' understanding of what is legitimate and what illegitimate in 
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religious belief'." Consequently, analytic philosophers 'have not attempted 
to discover some perch above the fray from which they could qua rational 
beings, practice suspicion and lodge critique.'9 
These general conclusions about philosophy create tensions for 
Wolterstorff's argument. Are they arrived at from a particularist perspec-
tive? If so, how is this supposed to work? Does one pop out, as it were, 
long enough to make these general claims, before popping back in again to 
resume one's particularist concerns? Alternatively, if 'perspectival particu-
larism' is the result of an enquiry, the enquiry itself cannot be dependent on 
it. The outcome of an enquiry cannot be a presupposition of it. 
Wolterstorff thinks that, sometimes, neo-Kantians give a distorted 
account of analytic philosophy. In response to them he says: 'the situation 
is not that we have failed to consider the Kantian alternative, and are still 
wandering about in unenlightened naivete; the situation is rather that we 
have considered the Kantian arguments and found them wanting. Kant is 
not some fact of nature with whom one has no choice but to cope."" On the 
other hand, Wolterstorff admits that in disputes over the distinction 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal, 'we live with self-serving car-
icatures by each party of the other.'ll Clearly, whether he likes it or not, 
Wolterstorff is involved in a discussion with philosophers of different per-
suasions. He hopes they will recognise distortions of analytic philosophy, 
the difference between an argument and a self-serving caricature, and the 
shortcomings in Kantian claims. This discussion does not owe its character 
to 'perspectival particularism'. What, then, is its character? It can be 
brought out by considering Reformed epistemology's critique of the 
Enlightenment ideal of rationality. 
Reformed epistemologists reject the ideal of a Wissenschaft based on a 
conception of rationality thought to be shared by all human beings. On 
this view, a belief, to be rational, must be based on evidence available to all. 
Beliefs are justified in terms of other beliefs said to be basic, and thus not 
needing any further evidence. Religious beliefs are held not to be basic, 
and must therefore be justified by evidence. 
fn attacking this idea, its intelligibility is questioned. That is philosophy's 
concern: a concern with the intelligibility of things. It is for that very reason 
that we can ask whether Reformed epistemology's conception of belief is 
any more satisfactory than that of classical foundationalism. Reformed 
epistemologists can be asked whether they give self-serving caricatures of 
Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians. After all, Reformed epistemology is not 
an experiential or revelatory fact with which we simply have to cope.12 
Philosophy's concern with the intelligibility of things is as old as the 
Presocratics. In that sense, it does and must seek a perch above the fray, 
but this does not involve, what Wolterstorff fears, a recourse to classical 
foundationalism. On the contrary, Wittgenstein says, 'My ideal is a certain 
coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling 
with them.'13 Is Wolterstorff saying that this is impossible? Philosophy is 
the endless task of giving the kind of attention to the world in all its variety 
which does conceptual justice to it. 
This conception of philosophy is exemplified in a discussion between 
Peter Winch and Stephen Mulhall concerning Charles Taylor's Sources of the 
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Self Mulhall accused Taylor of advocating a theistic conception of the self, 
while claiming to have conducted a disinterested enquiry. Mulhall's advice 
was to be open about this, to embrace, it might be said, perspectival particu-
larism; to be clear that one is 'stage-strutting', not 'stage-setting'Y Winch 
responds: Mulhall 'seems to forget that to stand on the stage and speak in 
one's own voice is not the only, or even the most characteristic, use of the 
stage. One also stages dramas, in which a diversity of characters speaking in 
different voices are portrayed. Of course, sometimes plays are didactic and it 
is clear that the author is trying to promote a particular message of his own; 
but this is not always the case. One need only think of Shakespeare, for 
instance. The aim may be to portray as faithfully as possible a segment of 
life, without shying away from the possibility of there being irresolvable 
conflicts (not merely divergences) which can only have a tragic outcome.'!S 
Applying the analogy to philosophy, Winch says: 'Now there does exist 
a philosophical tradition which has concerned itself precisely with the 
problem how to present moral or religious world-views in such a way that 
the passion behind them, which has to be evident if one is to recognize 
them for what they are, is clearly in view, along with the conception of the 
good they embody, while at the same time equal justice is done to alterna-
tive and even hostile conceptions. Achieving this is a task of enormous dif-
ficulty, both at the technical level and also because of the moral demands it 
makes on the writer, who will of course him or herself have strong moral 
or religious commihnents and will also be hostile to certain other possibili-
ties ... The three philosophers who seem to me to have addressed most 
directly and successfully the problems involved in this sort of representa-
tion are Plato (writing in dialogue form), Kierkegaard (representing con-
flicting viewpoints pseudonymously) and Wittgenstein.'!6 
Notice that in speaking of this contemplative conception of philosophy, 
Winch speaks of the moral demands made on the writer, demands which 
are constitutive of this conception of intellectual enquiry, and the view of it 
as a high calling. Wolterstorff virtually ignores this central conception of 
philosophy because, as I have said, he tends to assume that the alternative 
to Reformed epistemology can only be classical foundationalism. This is 
important, since it accounts for Wittgenstein sitting oddly in W olterstorff' s 
reading of twentieth-century philosophy. Equally important, it also 
accounts for his taking for granted a philosophical assumption which calls 
for the greatest scrutiny. 
II. The History of an Assumption 
P. M. S. Hacker writes: (Wittgenstein's) 'contribution to metaphysics is 
wholly critical, for he understood metaphysics to be an intellectual aberra-
tion - a thorough-going confusion of propositions belonging to a form of 
representation with propositions describing reality.'!7 Wolterstorff writes: 
' ... most analytic philosophers of religion simply take metaphysical real-
ism for granted including metaphysical realism concerning God."R It 
would seem to follow that, for Wittgenstein, most analytic philosophers 
would be taking for granted what needs closest attention - intellectual 
aberrations and thorough-going confusion. 
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Many analytic philosophers of religion would respond by saying that 
this clash is due to the fact that whereas they are realists, Wittgensteinians 
are non-realists. But that suggestion has exegetical problems. If 
Wittgenstein is a non-realist, what are we to make of the reference to 
'propositions concerning reality' in Hacker's remarks? Wittgenstein is not 
denying, as the sceptic does, that we make contact with reality. He is saying 
that metaphysics distorts what that contact amounts to. Once that is under-
stood, we see that the central issue in the dispute between Wittgensteinian 
philosophers of religion and analytic philosophers of religion, concerns an 
assumption that the latter simply take for granted - the assumption that 
there is no difference between realism and metaphysical realism. 
Wolterstorff uses the terms interchangeably. On the very next page, 
after the remarks just quoted, he says, 'most recent analytic philosophers 
do indeed take metaphysical realism concerning the external world and 
the self for granted, and also realism concerning God."9 Clearly, 
Wolterstorff is not intending to contrast realism concerning God, with 
metaphysical realism concerning the external world and the self, since, as 
we have seen, on the previous page, he has said that metaphysical realism 
includes metaphysical realism concerning God. 
Because Wolterstorff equates realism and metaphysical realism, this 
affects his reading of twentieth century philosophy. Again, contrast 
Hacker and Wolterstorff in this respect. Hacker writes: 'Wittgenstein's 
influence dominated philosophy from the 1920s until the mid 1970s. He 
was the prime figure behind both the Vienna Circle and the Cambridge 
school of analysis, and the major influence upon Oxford analytic philoso-
phy in the quarter of a century after the Second World War.'20 These move-
ments were both analytical and anti-metaphysical. By contrast, 
Wolterstorff describes the results of Moore's and Russell's critiques as fol-
lows: 'idealism was beaten back in the English-speaking world; the meta-
physical realism which had traditionally dominated anglophone philoso-
phy resumed its composure. The origins of analytic philosophy lie in that 
realist intervention of Moore and Russel1.'21 One is puzzled: how could 
metaphysical realism be thought to resume its composure via movements 
which were anti-metaphysical? The answer is in the misleading equation 
of metaphysical realism with realism. If one were to write a history of 
twentieth-century philosophy, noting the development of what is normally 
called 'analytic philosophy', the use of 'analytic' in 'analytic philosophy of 
religion' would appear anomalous, to say the least. 
This is not a squabble over labels. It helps us to understand why, in 
their reading of twentieth-century philosophy, Reformed epistemologists 
virtually ignore the revolution that occurred in it. It helps us also to under-
stand why Wittgenstein found the confusions of metaphysical realism in 
the very philosophical movements from which Wolterstorff traces the his-
torical lineage of an analytical philosophy of religion which takes meta-
physical realism for granted. On the one hand, we have Wittgenstein say-
ing, 'Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest 
thing'.22 On the other hand, we have Wolterstorff saying, 'the best place to 
begin the story which leads up to contemporary analytic philosophy is 
with the philosophers of the latter third of the seventeenth century and 
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with their eighteenth century successors.'23 
W olterstorff is right, the problems of Reformed epistemology are rooted 
in eighteenth century epistemology. These problems, however, result from 
the Cartesian legacy which empiricism inherited. It was that legacy that 
Wittgenstein turned on its head by exposing its self-imposed parameters. 
What are those parameters? The Cartesian legacy takes for granted that 
the necessary starting-point in any investigation of reality is one's own con-
sciousness. Its central question is how, from that consciousness, I can have 
any confidence in a reality independent of it. Empiricists, Kantians and 
Reformed epistemologists differ in their responses to that question, but they 
agree on the form of the problem to be faced. Wittgenstein questions the very 
fonn of the problem, by calling into question the notions of 'consciousness' 
and 'metaphysical reality' which constitute it. 
Descartes' legacy has been epistemological, but his deepest problems 
belong to logic. We make distinctions between 'knowledge', 'belief', 
'doubt', 'mistake' and 'ignorance', but he asks whether these are reliable, 
and seeks an external guarantee for them. His search for this Archimedean 
point is seen in the extremities of his methodological doubt, his dream 
argument, and in his conjecture that we might be in the hands of a malig-
nant demon. If we cannot know that we are not thus deceived, then, as 
Barry Stroud said of the dream argument, we lose the whole world.24 Our 
most familiar certainties are taken from us. 
Descartes finds his Archimedean point in the existence of a God who is 
no deceiver, but his proof of such a guarantee for even our clear and dis-
tinct ideas depends on our idea of God being clear and distinct. Thought is 
chasing its own tail. 
Note the spatial metaphors in Descartes' dilemma: how, from inside my 
consciousness, can I be sure that there is a reality outside it? The metaphors 
are religiously tempting. After all, is not God other than the world? But 
does a metaphysical notion of reality provide the logical space in which 
God's transcendence is to be understood? In On Certainty, Wittgenstein 
shows how it turns out to be no place at all. 
Wittgenstein creates a Cartesian moment in G. E. Moore's Cambridge gar-
den, by alluding to a discussion there which Moore had with Norman 
Malcolm. Near to them was a tree familiar to both. Moore insisted on the 
propriety of saying, 'I know that that's a tree'. Why? Partly, no doubt, 
because he wanted to argue against those who wanted to restrict the use of 
'know' to the truths of logic and mathematics, but that is not what interested 
Wittgenstein. There are plenty of circumstances in which it would be appro-
priate to make the statement, but these did not interest Wittgenstein either. 
What interested Wittgenstein was Moore's desire to use 'know' in the 
familiar circumstances we have depicted. Moore admits that if anyone 
asked him how he knew that that's a tree, anything he appealed to would 
be less certain than his present sureness. It was that 'sureness' that inter-
ested Wittgenstein, and the temptation to ask how we can know that our 
'sureness' is sure. Alluding jokingly to the Moore/Malcolm discussion 
Wittgenstein says, 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden, he says again and again 
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"I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone 
else arrives and observes this, and I tell him, "This fellow isn't insane. 
We are only doing philosophy.'25 
The comparison with Descartes is obvious. There is a desire to be the 
'knower' of the world from some imagined point outside it. But are things 
any better if we look for an epistemological substitute for this metaphysical 
use of 'know', such as 'believe', 'trust', 'assume', or 'take for granted'? The 
trouble is that each and every substitute proposed already has an employ-
ment elsewhere. We are not searching in the wrong direction. We are 
searching in what turns out to be no direction at all. Wittgenstein would 
say of all the substitutes proposed - 'believe', 'trust', 'assume' or 'take for 
granted' - what he says of the metaphysical use of 'know'; 
'In its language-game it is not presumptuous. There, it has no higher 
position than, simply, the human language-game. For there it has a 
restricted application. 
'But as soon as I say the sentence outside its context, it appears in a false 
light. For then it is as if I wanted to insist that there are things that I know. 
God himself can't say anything to one about them.'26 
A phrase such as, 'no higher position than, simply, the human language-
game' tempts Reformed epistemologists to think that Wittgenstein is saying 
that we are locked inside our language garnes, and cannot see the sober facts 
about the world which are outside them. Notice the influence of the 
Cartesian legacy with its spatial metaphors for meaning. The charge is a bad 
misunderstanding. It confuses what Wittgenstein is saying with something 
akin to the 'interpretation-universalism' Wolterstorff finds in neo-
Kantianism, where we are interpreters of a world we can never know in 
itself.27 Ironically, Wolterstorffs criticism is too close for comfort to a 
Reformed epistemology which, as we shall see, makes us believers in a world 
we can never be sure of. 
When Wittgenstein refers to the use of words in language games as 
'restricted', he is not using the word in a pejorative sense. By 'restricted 
application' he simply means 'definite application'. When words do not 
have 'restricted application', in this sense, they do not win a glorious free-
dom, but drift into vacuity and nonsense. In Plato's expression, words 
become 'winged words'. In Wittgenstein's expressions, language is idling, 
or has gone on holiday. That is why Wittgenstein says that our task is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their ordinary use. 
These conclusions apply to the word 'God' as to any other. Wolterstorff 
says, 'it is the sublimity of God which limits our understanding'.2M That 
remark can and does have a religious significance.29 If it is thought to entail 
metaphysical realism, however, we sublime the notion of God's sublimi-
ty.311 It is shown in a false light. God himself could not tell us anything 
about it. How does this corne about? 
III. On Reading the History of a Problem 
Wolterstorff says that we need to appreciate the history of philosophy 
from Locke to Kant if we want to appreciate central issues in contemporary 
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philosophy of religion. He says that our views on the subject's prospects 
depend on whether we find this history distressing. 31 But how does one 
read the distress? What if it resides in the fact that metaphysical realism 
loses our familiar world? 
Wolterstorff writes: 'Locke was a representative of what Reid called 
"the Way of Ideas". On this view, the only entities with which we have 
any acquaintance - that is, the only entities which can be presented to us -
are mental entities. There is a vast range of reality outside the mind of each 
of us; in Locke there is not so much as a whiff of metaphysical anti-realism 
concerning the external world. But our knowledge of external reality can 
be gained only by way of inference:32 
The question we need to ask, however, is not whether Locke was a 
metaphysical anti-realist, but whether he was a metaphysical realist. There 
is ample reason to say that very often he is, and, as a result, cannot give an 
adequate account of the reality of our dealings with things. 
Even if Locke's notion of inference were unproblematic, it relegates 
most of our existence to the twilight of probabilities. It ought to be remem-
bered that the philosophical tradition which offers us an inferred God, is 
the same philosophical tradition that offers us inferred husbands, wives, 
children, friends and human beings. Of course, none of this does justice to 
our dealings with the world. The only practical effect, as Wittgenstein 
says, would be to add the word 'probably' to statements which would not 
normally contain it. Instead of saying, 'I was soaked in the rain', we'd say, 
'I was probably soaked in what was probably rain'. We would, of course, 
have to invent a new word for our ordinary uses of 'probably'. 
But matters are more serious. From Locke's starting-point, it is logically 
impossible to get to the reality of things. Despite the fact that Locke says 
we can have knowledge of nominal essences, the general kinds which 
denote clusters of qualities, he denies that we can know the real essence of 
things. Sometimes, Locke seems to tell us what the real essence is, namely, 
'the microphysical primary-quality constitution of a thing'.33 But it is logi-
cally odd to say that there is something we do not know, and then to tell us 
what the something is. Jonathan Bennett tries to alleviate the situation by 
arguing that all Locke wishes to say is that our scientific discoveries are 
open to revision. The claim that real essences cannot be known has no 
more than a regulative function. It is simply a case of Locke, with 'charac-
teristic intelligence, insight and humility (taking) every possible chance ... 
to stress the gap between the intellectual control we do impose on the 
world and the science-plus-conceptual-scheme which we might find 
appropriate if we "cured our ignorance".'34 
Even if one accepted Bennett's suggestion, without qualification, misun-
derstandings of it must be avoided if we are to keep the realism of our con-
tact with things. First, it does not follow that a scientific account of things 
shows our ordinary descriptions to be incorrect or confused. Physics does 
not rob us of the solidity or colour of the table. Second, when scientific 
conclusions are revised, it is seldom the case that no knowledge is attained 
from their unrevised forms. Third, the possibility of revision to scientific 
conclusions should not lead to the conclusion that reality is ultimately 
mysterious. That no scientific enquiry is the last one, indicates that new 
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questions and interests may arise, not that there is a 'something' which, by 
its nature, defies our questions, interests and investigations. 
In Locke, however, there are passages which suggest that unknowable 
'something'. It is these which make it difficult to accept Bennett's view, 
unreservedly, that we should distinguish between Locke's notions of 'real 
essence', and his notion of 'substratum'. For example, Locke says: 
'The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our 
complex ideas is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge 
of that constitution of man from which his faculties of moving, sensation, 
and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which his so regular shape 
depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has, we 
should have a quite other idea of his essence than what is now contained in 
our definition of that species, be it what it will.'35 
Here we have a 'something' about which our ignorance cannot be 
cured. The substratum cannot be 'the microphysical primary-quality con-
stitution', since, as Bennett says, the substratum cannot fall under any 
description. Any suggested description would be a quality, or set of quali-
ties, needing its support. At the level of particular things, this leads to the 
confused notion of a 'thing' as a further element beyond all possible 
descriptions. At a general level, it becomes the Reality underlying all 
things. Locke admits that this is a 'something he knows not what', but 
which is known to God. But this 'something' is the product of confusion. 
If I say, 'The table is brown', 'brown' is a quality of the table. But when I 
say, 'This thing is a table', I am not indicating a quality of the thing, but 
telling you what the thing is. We were not taught, 'This is a thing', as 
though 'thing' is a kind of thing alongside tables and chairs. When all 
things become predicated of the fundamental thing, called Reality, the con-
fusion is simply compOLmded. This reality, wruch Locke thinks is known 
by God, and possibly angels, is the product of this metaphysical realism, of 
the ultimate 'something' which not even God could tell us anything about. 
Difficulties with Locke's notion of the substratum, and of what can be 
predicated of it, are connected with fundamental difficulties concerning the 
empiricist conception of ideas as mental entities. To have an idea is to have 
a capacity, it is to be able to do something. If we sever the connection 
between ideas and practice, it becomes impossible to give an account of 
what ideas they are.36 In Locke, ideas are self-authenticating; they are sup-
posed simply to tell us what they are. But how is one supposed to know 
that the idea one has today is the same idea as the one one had yesterday? 
'TIl ere must be a distinction between what one thinks, and whether it is so. 
One's idea of a chair is answerable to what we mean by 'chair', a meaning 
which comes from our dealings with chairs. Of course, T can think of a 
chair, on a specific occasion, without having any practical dealings with 
chairs, but such occasions are logically dependent on those dealings. 
It is important to remember that our life with concepts includes the true 
and false judgements we make. According to Locke, that we have ideas at 
all is due to 'the secret operations' of matter. This will not account for the 
difference between truth and falsity, since falsity would be as much a 
causal effect as truth. But the most fundamental confusion of all is when 
these conceptions, our capacities (including true and false judgements), are 
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treated as though they are beliefs, or even hypotheses, about a reality 
beyond themselves. This is the metaphysical reality which not even God 
could tell us anything about.37 
Wolterstorff finds these difficulties in Kant: 'Reality puts in its appear-
ance to us in the form of the intuitional content of our mind. If it is to do 
so, the intuitions must be structured by us in various ways. For one thing, 
they must be subjected to the formal structures of space and time. 
Secondly, they must be conceptually structured ... The reality of tables and 
chairs consists, at bottom, of our conceptualizing certain of our intuitions 
as perceptions of enduring tables and chairs.'38 Wolterstorff spells out the 
radical consequences of this analysis. A boundary is created which 'is for 
one thing the boundary between the intuitional content of the human mind 
and what lies beyond it. But since that intuitional content of the mind con-
sists of how reality puts in its appearance to us, the boundary is also the 
boundary between ultimate reality and the appearance thereof.'39 
The view that the reality of tables and chairs consists of our conceptual-
izations, comes from the confusion of concepts and things we have noted. 
When I say, 'There are chairs and tables in the room', I am not saying any-
thing about concepts. I am referring to the tables and chairs. But when I 
say, 'That is a chair', in teaching sometime to speak, I am elucidating the 
concept 'chair'. As Hacker said, it is only by confusing propositions con-
cerning modes of representation, with propositions describing reality, that 
the latter are made mere appearances of a reality said to be on the other 
side of an uncrossable boundary. A 'God' placed beyond such a boundary, 
is as confused a notion as that of 'the boundary' itself. 
IV. Reid and Reformed Epistemology: Continuing the Problem 
The scepticism, latent in Locke, becomes explicit in the progression of 
thought to Hume. Locke fails to break out of 'the circle of ideas'. Berkeley 
and Hume also fail. Berkeley said that our ideas of perception have a 
greater consistency. Hume said they are more lively and vivacious. But all 
to no avail, since our ideas can be as consistent, lively and vivacious as we 
like, and yet not refer to any reality independent of themselves. The 
Cartesian circle remains intact. 
Does the circle remain intact in Reformed epistemology, and in the 
work of Thomas Reid which has influenced it so much? At first, it would 
appear not. Reid writes: 'I perceive a tree that grows before my window; 
there is here an object which is perceived; and an act of the mind by which 
it is perceived; and these two are not only distinguishable, but they are 
extremely unlike in their natures. The object is made up of a trunk, branch-
es and leaves; but the act of mind by which it is perceived, hath neither 
trunk, branches not leaves.'4o 
These words may be thought to show how far Reid is from one version 
of Berkeley's thought, but as Peter Winch has pointed out, so far, this sim-
ply takes Reid back to the problem with which Berkeley began: what is the 
relation between 'the act of mind' and 'the object perceived'?4! We are still 
within the parameters of Descartes' dilemma: how, from my conscious-
ness, can I have any confidence in a reality independent of it? 
Reid distinguished between our original perceptions and our acquired 
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perceptions. The former include the figure, extension and movement of 
bodies, and their hardness and softness perceived by touch. The latter 
include the taste of cider, the smell of an apple, the voice of a friend, and 
the sound of a coach passing. According to Reid, acquired perceptions are 
'suggested' by 'original perceptions'. In this appeal to 'suggestion', Reid 
thought he was doing no more than elucidating our familiar experiences. 
Reid writes: 'We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests imme-
diately to the mind that a coach is passing in the street; and not only pro-
duces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. Yet there is 
no comparing of ideas, no perception of agreements or disagreements, to 
produce this belief; nor is there the least similitude between the sound we 
hear, and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing.'"' 
Winch shows how this analysis distorts our notion of suggestion. He 
asks us to imagine that we are in the heart of a forest where there are no 
tracks. The sound of wind rustling in the leaves may suggest the sound of 
a coach passing. Notice, in this context, that the sound suggests something 
other than itself. Applying this sense of 'suggest' to the sound of a coach 
passing, it might suggest nothing at all, or a Christmas card scene. The 
connections here are psychological and contingent. But when I hear the 
sound of a passing coach, that is what I hear, not a sound which suggests 
that a coach is passing. Reid's analysis distances us from the realism of the 
sound of passing coaches. 
Reid's analysis gets its plausibility from unfavourable circumstances. I 
hear the sound in the house, but the coach is passing in the street. Sight 
may correct sound. I hear a sound I think is a coach, but I look out of the 
window and see it is made by a large lorry. But Reid is not offering an 
analysis of unfavourable cases, but of standard ones, standard cases which 
apply to sight as much as to sound. As Winch says, it is appropriate to say 
that a cloud suggests a camel, but not to say that seeing a camel suggests a 
camel. Reid psychologises epistemology. The connection between sights 
and sounds, and what they suggest, is psychological and contingent, 
whereas the connections between seeing and what is seen, and between 
hearing and what is heard, are internal, conceptual connections. 
One confusion which contributes to the psychologising of epistemology, 
Winch argues, is the assumption that when I recognise something that I 
hear, 'the recognition must be an additional process, additional to, and 
simultaneous with the hearing.'" Reid says that when I hear the sound of a 
coach passing, I have an image of the coach passing at the same time. But, 
as Winch argues, it is no more necessary to have an image of the coach 
when I hear it, but do not see it, then it is to have an auditory experience 
when I see a coach, but do not hear it.44 
The most far-reaching confusion in epistemology, however, is found in 
the psychologising of the notion of belief itself. Wittgenstein asks, 'How 
does such an expression as "I believe" ... ever come to be used? Did a phe-
nomenon, that of belief, suddenly get noticed? Did we observe ourselves 
and discover the phenomenon in that way? Did we observe ourselves and 
other people and so discover the phenomenon of belief?'45 Plantinga seems 
to answer these questions in the affirmative, according to his account of 
what happens to him when he sees a horse, or coral tiger-lilies. He tells us, 
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'When I perceive a horse, I am the subject of experiences of various kinds: 
sensuous imagery (J am appeared to in a certain complicated and hard-to-
describe fashion, ... There is also doxastic experience. When I perceive a 
horse, there is that sensuous and affective experience, but also the feeling, 
experience, intimation with respect to a certain proposition (that I see a 
horse) that that proposition is true, right, to be believed, the way things real-
ly are ... So can I tell from my experience that there is a horse there? 
Certainly. Telling such a thing from one's experience is forming the belief 
that a horse is there in response to the sensuous and doxastic experience.'46 
These views are amplified in what Plantinga tells us about what happens 
when he sees tiger lilies, or when he remembers what he had for breakfast: 
'I look out into the backyard: I see that the coral tiger lilies are in bloom. I 
don't note that I am being appeared to in a certain complicated way ... and 
then make an argument that in fact there are coral tiger lilies in bloom 
there. (The whole history of philosophy up to Hume and Reid shows that 
such an argument would be thoroughly inconclusive.) It is rather that 
upon being appeared to in that way (and given my previous training), the 
belief that the coral tiger lilies are in bloom spontaneously arises in me ... 
The same goes for memory. You ask me what I had for breakfast; I think 
for a moment and then remember: pancakes with blueberries. I don't 
argue the fact that it seems to me that I remember having pancakes for 
breakfast to the conclusion that I did; rather, you ask me that I had for 
breakfast, and the answer simply comes to mind.'" 
There are a number of responses to be made to these comments. Let us 
begin with the case of memory. Plantinga is asked what he had for break-
fast, and an answer comes to his mind. But what makes the answer a mem-
ory? Not the psychological texture of the answer, not the way it feels. 
What makes it a memory is that it accurately recalls what Plantinga had for 
breakfast. There is an internal conceptual relation between a memory, and 
what it is a memory of. Not even God can 'give' one memories without 
that relation. This has caused difficulties for some analytic philosophers 
who think that if we are to have a resurrected body, God has to make it out 
of fresh atoms. It is then said that God will give the new being the correct 
memories. But since the resurrected Plantinga, so conceived, did not have 
pancakes with blueberries for breakfast, not even God could give it the 
memory of having done so. 
Second, let us look at the notion of a doxastic experience, the alleged feel-
ing we have about certain propositions. Such feelings suffer the same fate 
as Berkeley'S consistent ideas, and Hume's lively and vivacious ideas. We 
can have as many feelings about propositions as we like. This is still con-
sistent with their not being true. 
Third, let us look at the connection between Plantinga's notion of belief 
and action. Wittgenstein does not deny that an expression of belief some-
times informs us of a psychological state in a person. He gives the follow-
ing example: 'He's coming! I can't believe it.'"' But this is not generally so. 
10 say 'I believe p' is to make an assertion, and what this comes to is shown 
by the context in which the assertion is made, not by reference to the men-
tal state of the person making the assertion. What does this look like in 
Plantinga? The confusions about 'recognition', we have already noted, 
494 Faith and Philosophy 
leads him to think that when I see a tree or coral tiger lilies, I am appeared 
to in certain complicated ways. The fact that he finds it difficult to describe 
these is the unrecognised result of this confusion. Of course, he does not 
argue from the appearance to the beliet but the experience is supposed to 
form the belief. Further, it is a further quality or quantity of belief that gives 
it warrant as knowledge. But how does this lead to action? Wittgenstein 
expounds the confusions that occur when we go down this psychologised 
road: 'I should have to be able to say: "I believe that it's raining, and my 
belief is trustworthy, so T trust it." As if my belief were some kind of sense-
impression. Do you say, e.g., "I believe it, and as I am reliable, it will pre-
sumably be so?/I/1 That would be like saying: "I believe it - therefore I 
believe it."q'l But if this second 'belief', however confused a notion it may 
be, is also a mental phenomenon, is that to be believed to be acted on? And 
so on, ad infinitum, the never ending journey which comes from confusing 
'belief' as an assertion with a mental state.50 
Let me put Plantinga on his horse, with an armful of coral tiger-lilies 
picked from a familiar garden, watched as he rides in familiar surround-
ings by long-standing friends. The concept of perception includes tactile as 
well as visual and auditory experience. That being so, wouldn't it be odd 
for Plantinga to say, in the circumstances I have described, that he knows or 
believes that he is riding his horse, carrying the flowers, etc. It is even odder 
to say that he is being 'appeared to' by his horse, flowers, surroundings, 
and friends in ways difficult to describe, experiences which, in Reid's lan-
guage, suggest to him immediately that he is riding a horse, carrying flow-
ers, being seen by friends, in familiar surroundings. If he were to 
philosophise in this way as he rode, and someone heard him, wouldn't we 
say to that person, with Wittgenstein, 'The fellow isn't insane, he is simply 
doing philosophy'? 
The reference to insanity is important. It is relevant to the distinction 
between 'mistake' and 'madness'. Suppose Plantinga could be persuaded 
that he is not riding his horse etc., in the circumstances I have described, 
but is using the example in a tutorial in his room at Notre Dame, what 
would he say? If it were a matter of knowledge or belie( he would have to 
say that he had made a mistake, albeit a rather big one! But, of course, he 
would not say that. Think of it actually happening to one. One would be 
terrified and think one was going insane. As Wittgenstein says in On 
Certainty, all one's yardsticks would be breaking up. In emphasising this, 
Wittgenstein's interest is not in prophecy, not in asking, 'What would hap-
pen if?', but with the sureness involved in our being in the world, with that 
which we do not question. That is why we run into difficulties when we 
use 'know' or 'believe' to express our relation to things we do not question, 
or seek warrant for. 
If I were to indulge in theology, I would say of the circumstances I have 
described - do not speak of being appeared to by a horse and flowers, or of 
suggestions, however immediate, of their presence; do not ask as you ride 
the horse, or smell the flowers, how you know that, or whether your beliefin 
them has warrant - these realities are the horse, the flowers, the friends and 
familiar surroundings, that God has given: accept them - they are there 
like our lives. In being thrown back on psychologised beliefs and assump-
REALISM VERSUS METAPHYSICAL REALISM 495 
tions, as Descartes was thrown back on his ideas, Reformed epistemolo-
gists, like the founder of the Cartesian circle fail to break out because of 
their failure to embrace the sureness of our world, and their insistence that 
we could always be mistaken in any circumstances. 
V. Natural Beliefs as First Principles 
We find naturalist tendencies in Hume alongside his empiricism, a natu-
ralism which has important bearings on the issues we are discussing. In a 
famous passage, he writes: 'Thus the sceptic still continues to reason even 
tho' he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason ... Nature has 
not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too 
great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and specula-
tions. We may well ask, 'What causes induce us to believe in the existence of 
body? But 'tis in vain to ask Whether there be body or not? That is a point 
which we take for granted in all our reasonings.'i1 
Reid says that the belief should be regarded as a first principle. H. O. 
Mounce argues that it is 'the product rather of the mind's own workings 
than of what is supplied to the mind by sense experience or reasoning.'52 
This seems to leave the formation of the belief in the external world by the 
mind something of a mystery. Mounce says that 'children readily engage 
with external objects. The idea of an independent world is already implicit 
in their actions.'S3 But, he continues by saying, 'Moreover, it is evident that 
in all our experience or reasoning we presuppose that we are related to an 
independent world.'s, 'Implicit in' or 'Presupposed by' - which is it? 
There is quite a difference. 
We do not handle objects, sit on chairs, climb stairs, react to surround-
ings in innumerable ways, because we act on a first principle, or because 
we presuppose that there is an external world. Rather, we act in these 
ways. If a sceptic questions the reality of an independent world, what we 
do is to try to get him to reflect on our ways of acting, in ways which 
remove his desire to advance his sceptical thesis. 
Elsewhere, Mounce wants to talk of our natural beliefs as 'transcending 
experience'. He argues that Wittgenstein's distinction between 'saying' 
and 'showing' demonstrates how 'the existence of what transcends experi-
ence may be manifest in experience itself.'ss He thinks this is true, not only 
of views held in the Tractatus, but also of later discussions of grammatical 
propositions such as, 'A is an object'. Mounce argues that one cannot 
appreciate what the proposition means simply by describing particular 
objects. But he also says, 'grammatical propositions are entirely parasitic 
on what shows itself in language; their function, indeed, is to draw our 
attention to what shows itself there.'S6 Surely, the truth of the matter is that 
the language and its grammar go together; as soon as one has one, one has 
the other. As Mounce says of 'what it means for something to be an 
object', 'The child learns that as it learns to speak, or it does not learn it at 
alL" Mounce's talk of 'transcendence' simply confuses the issue, but he 
wants to make religious use of it. 
Because of Mounce's starker contrast, in Hume's Naturalism, between 
'experience' and the mind's natural beliefs which transcends it, Mounce is 
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faced with the task of explaining the harmony between them. He argues, 
with Reid, that while religious belief does not justify our natural beliefs, it 
makes them more intelligible: 'Assume that the world has a Creator and it 
is easy to explain the harmony between mind and nature which is exhibit-
ed in natural belief.'s8 But the need for such an explanation only arises if 
one accepts the empiricist dichotomy between 'mind' and 'nature' that I 
have been criticising. It is the same dichotomy that necessitates Plantinga's 
appeal to the proper functioning of faculties which have been designed 
according to God's plan. 
Similar consequences flow from Reid's discussion of the relation of sen-
sation to our original perceptions. Reid wanted to avoid the confusions of 
his predecessors: 'All the systems of philosophers about our senses and 
their objects have split upon this rock, of not distinguishing properly sensa-
tions, which can have no existence but when they are felt, from the things 
suggested by them.'59 Reid, like Reformed epistemologists after him, wanted 
to insist that the connection between the sensation and the original percep-
tion of, say, hardness, is not one of inference, comparison, or habitual asso-
ciation of sensations; it is not a matter of reflection at all. 
How, then, did Reid explain the connection? He concludes, 'Hence by 
all rules of just reasoning, we must conclude that this connection is the 
effect of our constitution, and ought to be considered as an original princi-
ple into which it may be resolved.'60 'Suggestion' is the name Reid gives to 
this original principle. 
Reid admits that his use of 'suggestion' departs from ordinary usage, 
but does want to draw an analogy with his use of it in relation to acquired 
perceptions. Winch shows why the analogy does not hold. In the case of a 
sound which suggests a coach passing, one can appeal to the relation 
between two distinct faculties, hearing and sight. But, as Winch points out, 
'there are no empirically distinguished sense organs associated with sensa-
tion and perception, respectively,'''' where original perceptions are con-
cerned. The sound of the coach, and the sight of it, are two distinct empiri-
cal realities. But I cannot, in the case of the hardness of the table, distin-
guish two distinct faculties, one which feels the hardness of the table, and 
another which is supposed to feel a different sensation at the same time. 
Reid admits that he has difficulty in locating what he calls this fugitive sen-
sation, sometimes resorting to the desperate measure of saying that we 
pass from the sensations to the original perception with such immediacy 
that we are unaware of the sensation we are having! Reid gets into this 
trouble by psychologising the conceptual or grammatical difference 
between contexts in which we attribute that hardness to the table, and con-
texts in which we refer to the sensation we experience when we press on it; 
the conceptual difference between 'an object of perception', and a 'sensa-
tion'. Winch concludes, 'It is a difference in logical type ... and not a differ-
ence in empirical characteristics, so that to talk as Reid does, of two differ-
ent mental faculties, connected together empirically by some queer psycho-
logical law, is grossly misleading, all the more so, as the relation between 
the two sorts of expression he is considering is entirely of his own making, 
a result of his own illegitimate extension of the world "sensation" beyond 
that allowed in ordinary discourse.'62 
REALISM VERSUS METAPHYSICAL REALISM 497 
By speaking in the way he does, Reid turns logical distinctions into an 
alleged insight into the nature of things which operates according to laws 
which are said, in the end, to be God's laws. Thus, instead of being 
Cartesian 'knowers' of our world, we become Reidian believers in it. We 
trust our faculties, assume that what they tell us of the world is reliable. 
But this 'trusting' and 'assuming' come between us and the realism of our 
being in the world. We trust, without Cartesian proof, in a God who is no 
deceiver.63 But ultimate appeals of this kind are based on the confused psy-
chologised epistemology which leads to them. The metaphysical God thus 
created depends on heaping first principle upon first principle. But what is 
built is a castle in the air. 
VI. For 'God liS Sake 
I have suggested that the form of a problem, determined by our 
Cartesian legacy, has remained unchanged for many philosophers of reli-
gion: how, from the necessary starting-point of consciousness, can I have 
any confidence in a reality independent of it? I have said little about the 
metaphysical concept of consciousness involved. 
Consciousness cannot tell me who I am.'''' As J. R. Jones has said, it is 
possible to pick out my consciousness 'in the required manner, that is, 
purely introspectively, only if it is assumed that I inwardly see a number of 
different consciousnesses. And this supposition is senseless.'65 But so is the 
notion of a self-authenticating 'This!' by which I attempt to guarantee my 
identity by a kind of inner pointing to myself. I am who I am, not as an 
isolated consciousness, but as a member of a human neighbourhood. 
Reformed epistemologists say that God is a person without a body.66 
This notion does not do justice to Biblical language concerning God.67 It is 
also incoherent. Divine consciousness, so conceived, could not tell God 
who he is. Further, what would make the thoughts of this divine con-
sciousness, existing in the isolation of eternity, the thoughts that they are? 
In short, we are back to all the logical difficulties connected with the pri-
vate language argument. 
One of Wolterstorff's caricatures of Wittgensteinians is found in his 
claim 'that if the Wittgensteinian was to talk about religious belief, he had 
to talk about the role of religious belief and speech in life; there was, on his 
view, nothing else for him to talk about.'''' This is the return of the confu-
sion between propositions which belong to modes of representation with 
propositions which describe reality. If one is praying to God, seeking God, 
feeling from God, one is not praying to, seeking, or fleeing from, a role in 
human life. One is praying to, seeking, or fleeing from, God. But if one is 
puzzled philosophically, as many are, about what this 'praying', 'seeking', 
or 'fleeing' amounts to, Wittgensteinians suggest that it is a good idea to 
look to those contexts in which such talk is rooted. If one did so, one might 
begin to ask what is meant by saying God is Spirit, or that he is 'other than' 
the world. One might ask whether that 'other than' is a spiritual matter, 
rather than a quasi-spatial relation. One might ask what it means to be in 
the spirit, to long for it, or to flee from it. 
I have been concerned to elucidate the grammar of these religious con-
498 Faith and Philosophy 
cepts in much of my work, but not on this occasion. On the fiftieth 
anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, and given the general philosophical 
ethos of Faith and Philosophy, I thought it more useful to discuss, with the 
help of Wittgenstein's insights, the very different metaphysical contexts in 
which philosophers have talked about God: God as the Archimedean 
point in Descartes' thought; God as the source of a reality conceived as the 
most general of all subjects of which everything else can be predicated, 
including the concepts in terms of which we make true and false judge-
ments; God as a reality in Kant's noumenal realm; God as the author of 
psychological laws which govern the formation of our original and 
acquired perceptions; God as the designer of our faculties; God as an 
assumption which explains the harmony between 'mind' and 'experience'; 
God as a person without a body; God as pure consciousness. I have sug-
gested that these exercises in metaphysical realism distort the realities, 
including religious realities, which they purport to illuminate. That is why, 
for 'God"s sake, it is important to turn aside from them. To see why we 
have been tempted by them is to see, at the same time, why God himself 
can't tell us anything about them. 
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